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Abstract
Egocentric distance estimation has been shown to depend on wearing safety gear, which promotes compensatory behavior, and on
target type, which regulates fight-or-flight responses. We hypothesized that the two factors interact, possibly in asymmetric fashion,
and set out to uncover the limits of this interaction in a perceptual task where individuals wearing helmets or baseball caps estimated
egocentric distance to non-threatening and threatening animals depicted on cards (i.e., safe and unsafe targets). We found that,
compared to participants wearing caps, participants wearing helmets overshoot distance estimations and were able to distinguish not
only between targets situated at two depth levels as participants wearing caps could, but also between safe targets situated at wide
and narrow visual angles. Our findings help define the interaction between safety devices and target type, thereby contributing to the
debate between advocates of prevention models and those who maintain that these are offset by compensatory strategies.
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Introduction
Human response in the face of danger is mitigated by com-
pensatory strategies. So, for example, cyclists ride faster or
more aggressively when wearing bicycle helmets, as they un-
duly believe the risk of injuries to be offset by safety equip-
ment (Adams & Hillman, 2001; Robinson, 2006). Also, peo-
ple tend to inflate virtual balloons closer to popping limit
when wearing helmets than when wearing baseball caps
(Gamble & Walker, 2016). Interestingly, wearing a helmet
cannot possibly prevent balloons from bursting, hence safety
devices trigger compensatory behavior irrespective of whether
or not they are relevant to the task at hand. Indeed, compen-
satory behavior is a general and unconscious tendency to-
wards taking increased risks when using protective equipment
(Peltzman, 1975; Wilde, 1982). As individuals feel safer, they
re-evaluate their previous behavior as being safer as well,
hence adapt (i.e., increase) the risk level of their current be-
havior to the lower safety threshold. An important question at
this point is whether and how safety devices interact with
target type to affect perceived safety and perceptual judgments
such as egocentric distance estimations. Do helmets, for in-
stance, increase safety levels regardless of target type, or do
they contribute jointly with targets to perceptual estimation
and decision making? We investigated this question in a study
where participants wearing helmets or baseball caps estimated
egocentric distances to safe and unsafe targets placed at vari-
ous locations away from them. We started from the assump-
tion that, unlike baseball cap wearers, helmet wearers would
emphasize payoffs (i.e., delay confrontation with neutral or
undesirable targets) by overshooting distance estimations, to
compensate for the feeling of safety that helmets usually
afford.
Egocentric distance estimation is a subjective adjustment of
perceived distance based on past experience or training with
judgments on actual distances. Perceived distance is usually
underestimated with respect to physical distance (Foley, 1972;
Foley et al., 2004), hence individuals use supplementary cues
to self-correct their perception (Gilinsky, 1951). However,
when people rely exclusively on motor cues, as when walking
to a target instead of verbally estimating its position with re-
spect to themselves, the distance they cover is linearly scaled
with the actual distance at least out to 20 m (Loomis et al.,
1992; Thomson, 1983). This disparity in estimations between
verbal and motor tasks is predicted by the action-specific
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account of perception (Proffit et al., 2003;Witt, 2011), accord-
ing to which individuals perceive targets in terms of their
ability to act upon them. For targets located at a distance
beyond reach, estimations are compressed, possibly as an at-
tempt to bring them closer to the subject.
Another factor contributing to egocentric distance estima-
tion is the physical characteristics of the observer. There is a
large body of evidence (for a review, see Philbeck & Witt,
2015) indicating that the perception of a subject’s environment
is scaled by the costs incurred for reaching a target. For exam-
ple, archers judge a particular target as being larger when they
use bow stabilizers, which makes them feel better about their
coordination and control abilities (Lee et al., 2012). Similarly,
drivers underestimate egocentric distances to a larger extent
compared to pedestrians (Moeller, Zoppke, & Frings, 2016),
as being in a car boosts their potential of reaching distant
targets without investing important physical resources.
Moreover, since drivers tend to identify themselves with the
car they are driving, they extend the perception of their body
in space and time (also see Berti & Frassinetti, 2000), which
makes distances appear shorter. Further, wemay speculate that
the action-specific account also explains distance underesti-
mation in virtual environments (Creem-Regehr et al., 2003;
Thompson et al., 2004), as images on a screen appear more
affordable, and therefore closer.
To summarize, distance estimation depends on the percep-
tion of both body and target. Specifically, there is a linear
correlation between target size and physical resources, and
an inverse correlation when targets are undesirable or difficult
to reach. For example, distances seem greater and hills steeper
when people are old, tired, or wearing a heavy backpack
(Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999; Proffitt et al., 1995, 2003).
Moreover, target identity and previous experience affect ego-
centric distance estimation. For example, individuals – espe-
cially those affected by phobias – view threatening objects as
being closer than they actually are (Riskind, Moore, &
Bowley, 1995), suggesting that looming danger and fearful
cognitive distortions are closely tied. Also, (social) control
over objects or individuals influences distance estimation, as
people tend to associate control with closer proximity and the
lack of control with greater distance (Wakslak & Kim, 2015).
We might anticipate that safety levels experienced by helmet
wearers compared to baseball cap wearers would make them
better equipped to reach desirable targets or block undesirable
ones. However, accumulating evidence (Canal Bruland,
Pijpers, and Oudejans, 2010; Harber et al., 2011; Witt &
Sugovic, 2013) suggests that threatening circumstances cancel
individuals’ propensity for perceiving the world in terms of
their ability to act upon it. From this perspective, the percep-
tion of the body (modified by headgear) and the perception of
threatening targets are independent of each other. From a risk-
management perspective, however, losses loom larger than
gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), irrespective of the
increased safety levels afforded by helmets in threatening con-
texts. Given that payoffs in risky scenarios involve avoiding
confrontation, and costs involve facing undesirable targets, we
predict that individuals will no longer focus on payoffs and
risk-compensate when estimating distances to unsafe targets,
but will focus on costs instead. Threatening targets should thus
appear closer than neutral targets.
In our study, safe and unsafe targets (i.e., non-threatening
and threatening animals illustrated on cards) were situated to
the right and to the left of an observer and further distributed
over two depth levels and two visual angles. We expect the
positive affect induced by safety headgear to induce relative
attentional widening, thus higher sensitivity for the location of
neutral targets. Indeed, researchers ever since Easterbrook
(1959) have reported that (relative) negative affect causes at-
tentional narrowing (Cohen, 1980; Chajut & Algom, 2003;
Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010; Steenbergen, Band, &
Hommel, 2011). If target type further modulates this effect,
we should be able to observe angle narrowing when targets are
unsafe compared to when they are safe.
Methods
Participants
We recruited 48 volunteers (24 females) with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision based on an a priori sample
size estimation for an F-test with eight within-groups re-
peated measures (safe vs. unsafe targets × four target lo-
cations) and two between-groups factors (baseball cap vs.
helmet wearers) run in G*Power 3.1.9.2 (Faul, Erdfelder,
Lang, & Buchner, 2007). We obtained a 95% chance of
correctly rejecting the null hypothesis of no difference
between helmet wearers and cap wearers when judging
the distance to threatening versus non-threatening targets
at four locations by 42 people (ηP
2 = 0.16). Participants
were all undergraduate students and signed an informed
consent form upon enrolment in the study, in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki. All participants were
screened in a preliminary session and completed the
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) and the
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory STAI-T (Spielberger et al.,
1973). Half of the participants in each group (helmet
wearers vs. baseball-cap wearers) were males, and the
other half females. We matched helmet and baseball cap
wearers in terms of self-esteem, t (46) = .834, p = .409 (M
= 30.45 vs. M = 29.37) and state anxiety ratings, t (46) =
-.279, p = .781 (M = 39.29 vs. M = 40.00). All partici-
pants received a small gift (cafeteria bonuses) for their
participation in individual testing sessions lasting up to
30 min. The protocol was approved by the Ethics




Stimuli consisted of two decks of 16 cards each that included
both safe and unsafe targets. We ran a preliminary study in
order to classify the illustrations on the 32 cards as either
threatening or non-threatening by asking ten participants to
estimate their threat level on a scale from 0 (Bnot very
threatening^) to 10 (Bvery threatening^). Scores for threaten-
ing animals were significantly different (p < .001) and about
four times as high as the scores for non-threatening animals
(M = 6.05, StDev = .68 vs.M = 1.59, StDev = .64). Cards in the
first deck illustrated non-threatening animals (e.g., horse, dog,
rabbit) and cards in the second deck illustrated threatening
animals (e.g., tiger, bat, shark). The cards were folded such
that they could be stood on a table at eight locations marked by
eight points not visible to participants. There were four loca-
tions in each hemifield, distributed over two depth levels (po-
sitions 1 and 2 closer by and positions 3 and 4 farther away)
and two visual angles (positions 1 and 3 at a narrow angle and
positions 2 and 4 at a wider angle) from the observer.
Euclidean distances were 75 cm, 80 cm, 90 cm, and 95 cm
for locations 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively, as seen in Fig. 1.
Design and procedure
Upon completing the participation consent form and prelimi-
nary questionnaires, participants were randomly assigned to
one of two headgear groups. Those in the first group wore a
yellow helmet (hard hat) all through the testing session, and
those in the second group wore a yellow cap instead. We
informed participants that wearing the designated headgear
was part of the experimental setup, and offered no supplemen-
tary information on the type of headgear other participants
might be asked to wear and on the potential effects of head-
gear on egocentric distance estimation. We considered it un-
likely that participants might recover our experimental hy-
pothesis that wearing a helmet as opposed to wearing a cap
is likely to compensate for distance underestimation biases in
both depth and visual angle. Moreover, by limiting verbal
interaction with the experimenter, we minimized unwanted
priming effects (Gilder & Heerey, 2018). The design included
headgear as a between-subjects factor and target valence (safe
vs. unsafe), depth level (close vs. far), and visual angle (nar-
row vs. broad) as within-subjects factors.
Participants were informed that, on each trial, they should
carefully investigate the card placed on the desk, estimate the
card’s distance with respect to where they were seated, which
was as close as possible to the midline of the short edge of the
desk, and name the animal illustrated on the card. In each trial,
the experimenter placed one randomly chosen card on an in-
dividually randomized marker on the desk. The card was re-
moved as soon as participants estimated the distance and
named the animal represented. Naming and distance-
estimation tasks were completed for cards placed in both
hemifields in front of the observer as well as in both
hemifields behind the observer, which were visible through
a hand-held mirror (dimensions 20 cm × 15 cm). In order to
visualize the hemifields behind them, participants turned 180°
and touched the edge of the table at the observation point with
their back. Chair height was adjusted for each participant. In
total, stimuli covered four individually randomized quadrants
(front right, front left, back right, back left), tested in just as
many blocks, and a total of 16 card placements. The study
followed a 2 (Headgear: Helmet wearers vs. Cap wearers) ×
4 (Position: 75 cm vs. 80 cm vs. 90 cm vs. 95 cm) × 2 (Threat
level: Non-threatening vs. Threatening)mixed factorial design
with estimated distance as dependent variable.
Results
Figure 2 shows average distance estimations across trials. We
entered the results in a 2 × 4 × 2 ANOVA and found a triple
interaction between all factors – headgear, distance, and threat
level, F (3, 44) = 3.09, p = .029, ηP
2 = .063. We further
analyzed the results for each headgear type separately.
Helmet wearers estimated distances to non-threatening targets
as being greater than distances to threatening targets, with
statistics approaching significance, F (1, 23) = 4.19, p =
.052, ηP
2 = .154 (M = 76 cm vs. 74 cm). We also found an
interaction between distance and threat-level, F (3, 21) = 3.62,
p = .017, ηP
2 = .136. Mauchly’s test of sphericity: χ2(5) =
4.87, p = .432. Paired comparisons revealed that, for safe
targets, helmet wearers distinguished between distances to
all four locations, F (3, 21) = 10.86, p < .001, ηP
2 = .608,
namely between the distance to the first location on the one
hand and the distance to the second (p = .003), the third (p <
.001), and the fourth location (p < .001) on the other hand, as
well as between the distance to the second and the distance to
the third location (p < .001) or the fourth location (p < .001),
and finally between the distance to the third location and the
distance to the fourth location (p = .025). When making their
estimations, participants thus took into account both the depth
level and the angle at which targets were situated with respect
to observation point. For unsafe targets, helmet wearers could
only distinguish between distances to locations at different
depth levels, F (3, 21) = 11.61, p < .001, ηP
2 = .624, namely
between the distance to the first location and the distance to
either the third or the fourth location (p < .001 for both), as
well as between distances to the second location and distances
to either the third or the fourth location (p < .001 for both), but
not between distances to locations at different angles, namely
between the distance to the first and distances to the second
location (p = .525), or between the distance to the third and the
distance to the fourth location (p = .246).
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When looking at the estimations made by cap wearers, we
observed a main effect of distance, F (3, 21) = 22.97, p < .001,
ηP
2 = .50 –Greenhouse-Geisser corrected to F (1.22, 28.16) =
22.97, p < .001, ηP
2 = .50, as they only distinguished between
distances to locations at different depth levels, namely be-
tween the distance to the first location and the distance to
either the third or the fourth location (p < .001 for both), as
well as between distances to the second location and distances
to either the third or the fourth location (p < .001 for both), but
not between distances to locations at different angles, namely
between the distance to the first and distances to the second
location (p = .130), or between the distance to the third and the
distance to the fourth location (p = .268). Differently put, cap
wearers discounted information on target safety when making
their estimations.
We further run a supplementary analysis to investigate the
role of sex or quadrant position for targets situated right-front,
right-back, left-front, and left-back, and found no differences
in performance between males and females (p > .05), but a
close-to-significant difference between targets across quad-
rants, F (3, 44) = 2.58, p = .056, ηP
2 = .053 such that distance
estimations were greater for the front quadrants compared to
the back-left quadrant, p = .05 and .046, respectively (M =
70.7 cm front-right and 71.01 cm front-left vs. 66.40 cm back-
left). The back-right quadrant had an average intermediate
value of 68.94 cm.
Discussion
We reported that people wearing helmets were inclined to
overshoot egocentric distance estimations to safe targets com-
pared to unsafe targets, unlike people wearing non-safety-
related headgear such as baseball caps. Estimations made by
helmet wearers were thus closer to actual Euclidean distances
between targets and observation point, as the general tendency
among naïve observers is to (severely) underestimate dis-
tances. The results lend support to the action-specific ap-
proach to perception, according to which individuals perceive
targets in terms of their ability to act upon them – here, in the
sense of blocking those targets one has no motivation to reach
for, such as neutral and threatening animals. In the same time,
the results concur with previous reports that threatening ob-
jects loom larger than non-threatening objects (Riskind,
Moore, & Bowley, 1995), which can be readily explained by
evolutionary principles: The closer unsafe targets are per-
ceived to be, the sooner observers can decide on the most
appropriate response (e.g., flight or fight) to manage an un-
wanted encounter. There were no differences, in terms of
Fig. 1 Experimental setup for egocentric distance estimation of targets
located in the front right and left quadrants (a). For targets situated in the
back right and left quadrants, participants turned 180° so their back
touched the table edge and looked through a hand-held mirror at the
targets now situated behind them. Examples of threatening and non-
threatening targets (b). Distances and sizes are not drawn to scale
Fig. 2 Average estimation scores by helmet wearers and baseball cap
wearers for threatening and non-threatening targets at positions 1, 2, 3,
and 4 (75 cm, 80 cm, 90 cm, and 95 cm) away from observation point.
Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals
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target valence, for estimations made by baseball cap wearers.
In contrast, helmet wearers took into account the valence of
targets as well as their perceived ability to act upon themwhen
estimating egocentric distance. Thus, they felt safe enough to
risk-compensate for safe targets, but focused on the losses
incurred for obtaining the payoff (i.e., delayed confrontation)
when estimating distances to unsafe targets. BThreat effects^
were previously described in terms of an independence be-
tween the perception of the body and the perception of target
valence (e.g.,Witt & Sugovic, 2013). Here, we reconcile them
with the results obtained for safe targets in the framework of
risk-taking behavior.
Unsurprisingly, all participants made larger distance esti-
mations for targets situated in the front right and left quadrants
compared to targets in the back quadrants, particularly the
back-left, suggesting that individuals remained on their guard
for targets they could not monitor or control, such as items
situated behind them, which they estimated to be much closer.
Alternatively, participants estimated targets in the left-back
quadrant as being closer than targets situated in any of the
other quadrants because they felt safest about this particular
location; they might tend to virtually lean on the left-back
region because they view it as a virtual support for their body.
This latter explanation would imply that individuals distin-
guish, at least functionally, between observation point and
bodily reference point when making egocentric distance
estimations.
Importantly, we reported that target identity was a relevant
factor insofar as helmet wearers discriminated between loca-
tions at different visual angles for safe targets. For unsafe
targets, their attention was restricted to a narrower angle.
Better perceptual estimations for both target depth and target
angle by helmet wearers under safe circumstances under-
scores the efficacy of using protective gear for recreational
purposes, thus helping circumscribe risk compensation behav-
ior and reconciling divergent findings in literature. Indeed,
compensatory strategies do not always explain cycling habits
(Phillips, Fyhri, & Sagberg, 2011) or vaccine-related behavior
(for a review, see Kasting et al., 2016). Further empirical in-
vestigation might reveal that wearing a helmet or securing
seatbelts are not relevant for preventing self-caused accidents
when drivers are heading to safe locations such as regular
routes to work, as they may be inclined to compensate by
taking risks, but that safety gear helps prevent such accidents
when drivers are heading to unknown or covertly unsafe jour-
neys such as vacation destinations. Overall, our findings help
address the ongoing debate between safety advocates who
endorse traditional models of prevention (e.g., Ruedl, Kopp,
& Burtscher, 2012) and those who maintain that safety mea-
sures are offset, at least to some extent, by risk compensation
(e.g., Fyhri & Phillips, 2013). The findings lend support to a
different account of compensatory behavior, in which helmet
wearers risk-compensate only when they perceive that the
costs associated with payoffs are decreasing rather than in-
creasing. More generally, we provided evidence that behavior
adaptation is blocked unless targets are safe.
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